Cheat sheet — Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind

Cognitive science and philosophy of mind

Area. Distributed cognition; the extended-mind debate; predictive processing, the free-energy principle and Markov blankets; coordination dynamics.

Introduction. Hutchins studied cognition as a property of socio-technical systems — a ship’s bridge, a cockpit — and derived the system’s boundary from where representational state actually flows, rather than declaring it. Clark and Chalmers asked when an external resource is part of a mind, and Adams, Aizawa and Rupert answered that coupling is not constitution. Predictive processing (Clark, Friston) explains perception, action and coordination with a single principle — minimise prediction error across a hierarchy of timescales — and Bruineberg and colleagues showed that the field’s central construct, the Markov blanket, is used in two incompatible ways: a formal construct inside a model, and a metaphysical claim about where a real boundary lies. Kelso and Tognoli show coordination arising from dynamics without any coordinating organ.

Three names. Edwin Hutchins, Andy Clark, Jelle Bruineberg.

Importance for cybernetics / VSM. The VSM has no criterion for what is part of the system rather than coupled to it, and it has never engaged the field that spent 25 years on exactly that question.

Importance for the article. §2.2’s instrumental/constitutive distinction comes from Bruineberg; §2.4 splits the boundary question in two; Demonstration IIIb (§8) tests whether VSM analysts and cognitive ethnographers carve the same joints — a potential novel corroborated prediction.

Start here.

  • the paper’s organising distinction.
  • the boundary criterion; chapter on the navigation team.

One outside text. Parr, T., Pezzulo, G., & Friston, K. J. (2022). Active Inference: The Free Energy Principle in Mind, Brain, and Behavior. MIT Press — the standard exposition, needed to judge whether PP subsumes S2/S3/S4.

More Details

This theme covers four lines of work in cognitive science and philosophy of mind that v02 imports to say what kind of claim the VSM makes and where a system ends: distributed cognition (the boundary criterion behind Demonstration IIIb), the extended-mind debate (the constitutive boundary question of §2.4), predictive processing and the Markov-blanket dispute (the instrumental/constitutive binary that organises §2.2 and the theorem/hypothesis parallel of §2.3), and coordination dynamics (System Two as regime rather than structure). A VSM practitioner needs it because the paper’s central move—separating what the analyst lays over an organisation from what is claimed to be there—was made in these fields first, with named positions. I would take 5.3 before 5.1 and 5.2, because Bruineberg et al. supply the distinction every later section uses; then 5.2, 5.1, 5.4.

Distributed cognition

Distributed cognition is the claim, made by Edwin Hutchins on the basis of ethnography aboard a US Navy ship and in airline cockpits, that the unit of analysis for cognitive work is not the individual but a functional system of people, artefacts and procedures. Fixing a ship’s position is

The extended mind and the coupling–constitution debate

Clark and Chalmers argued that when an external resource plays the functional role that internal memory would—Otto’s notebook standing in for Inga’s biological memory—it is part of the cognitive process, and that whether something is cognitive should not depend on its being inside the skull (the parity principle). The

Predictive processing, the free-energy principle and Markov blankets

Predictive processing (PP) holds that the brain is a hierarchical generative model that continually predicts its sensory input and propagates only prediction errors upward, with precision-weighting deciding which errors are allowed to drive revision. Perception is inference; action is the other way of reducing error, by changing the world

Coordination dynamics and metastability

Coordination dynamics studies how the components of a system—fingers, limbs, neural populations, people—form and dissolve patterns of coordinated behaviour, using the tools of nonlinear dynamics and Haken’s synergetics. Its founding result is the Haken–Kelso–Bunz model: two fingers oscillating in anti-phase switch abruptly to in-phase as frequency rises, a phase

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